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Abstract english: The paper focuses on the topic of the impact of piracy on the institu-
tional framework in the Kingdom of Naples during the Modern Age (XVIth ̶ XVIIth centu-
ries). Many historians agree that the continuous Ottoman̶-Barbaresque raids on the coast 
of Southern Italy played a key role in the conditions of fragility and weakness of the South 
and its progressive marginalization from the economic and productive networks of early 
modern Europe. Consequently, the paper first analyzes the reason for military weakness 
of the Kingdom of Naples, and then it examines the effect of defensive vulnerability on 
the political-constitutional field through a Juridical culture’s paradigmatic text: the Trac-
tatus de potestate Proregis et Collaterali Consilii et regimine Regni by Giovan Francesco 
De Ponte. In hindsight, the evaluation of the strategies of the government during the 
Spanish viceroyalty shows how the strong alliance between the Spanish Monarchy and 
the lawyers-administrators (the noble of robes) was a formidable legitimizing machine 
for the monarchy, but it also leads to the nobility progressively moving away from its tra-
ditional role of government and military defense. The final result of this compromise was 
to deprive the Kingdom of the only means that they had that could effectively counter 
attack the maritime dominance of the Ottoman-Barabresque pirates and feed a growing 
sense of insecurity which deeply scarred the fragile political balances of the southern 
Monarchy.
Keywords: Piracy; Privateering; Kingdom of Naples; Adriatic Sea; Freedom of the seas. 
Abstract italiano: Il contributo s’incentra sul tema dell’impatto della pirateria sull’assetto 
socio-istituzionale del Regno di Napoli in Età Moderna (XVI-XVII secc.). Numerosi storici 
sono concordi nell’affermare che le continue scorrerie ottomano-barbaresche sulle coste 
del Sud Italia rappresentarono nel lungo periodo uno dei fattori chiave della debolez-
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za e della fragilità del Mezzogiorno e della sua progressiva marginalizzazione dai circuiti 
economici e produttivi dell’Europa moderna. Attraverso questa prospettiva d’indagine, 
il contributo in primo luogo prova ad analizzare le ragioni della vulnerabilità sul piano 
militare del Regno di Napoli, per poi passare ad esaminarne i risvolti sul piano politico-co-
stituzionale attraverso un testo chiave della cultura giuridica napoletana: il Tractatus de 
potestate Proregis et Collaterali Consilii et regimine Regni di Giovan Francesco De Ponte. 
Sottotraccia, l’esame delle strategie di governo adottate durante il viceregno spagnolo 
dimostra come la strettissima alleanza tra i governanti spagnoli e il ceto di ministeriale di 
formazione giuridica costituì una formidabile macchina di legittimazione per la monar-
chia, ma comportò anche il progressivo allontanamento della nobiltà da ogni funzione di 
governo e di difesa militare. Il risultato di tale compromesso fu quello di privare di fatto 
il Regno dell’unica componente in grado di contrastare efficacemente il predominio as-
sunto sui mari dai pirati barbareschi e di alimentare una conflittualità latente destinata a 
segnare nel profondo i fragili equilibri politici della monarchia meridionale.




li turchi son calati alla marina/
chi n’ha le scarpe rutte, si lle sola/
nun ha paura di pigliar spine/
To arms, to arms/ 
the bell is ringing/
the Turks have landed/
he who has broken shoes, fix them/
don’t be worried about getting splinters/
These are the words of an old Calabrese folk song that tell the story of one of the 
most primitive and aggressive emotions of mankind: fear. In fact it was an ances-
tral fear, an all-encompassing fear that made up the daily life of the people of the 
coastal region of the south of Italy, who were continually attacked by pirates1.
Contemporary stories – not always reliable, but full of striking detail – repre-
sent a rich source to get back that collective feeling of anxiety that all the popula-
1 The following contribution is an elaboration and modification of the report given at Stra-
thclyde University of Glasgow during the Conference held from June 24 to 26, 2019, en-
titled The Problem of Piracy. An interdisciplinary Conference on Plunder by the Sea across 
the Word from the Ancient to the Modern. I am grateful to all the participants, in particu-
lar David Wilson, Mark Chadwich and Nathan Kwan for their helpful and stimulating sug-
gestions. At the present, it is not possible to provide a complete biographical outline of 
piracy in the Mediterranean in the Modern Age, as well as on the compelling phenome-
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tion got when they caught sight of the “Turks”. As told by the Dominican Serafino 
Razzi, in Francavilla on the Adriatic coast in 1576, it was enough to simply see 
two unknown ships to throw the population into such a panic that they, collected 
«the most precious things» together, «abandoned the city and ran to the cities 
nearby, sending the women first, from the coast to the top of the mountains»2.
The people’s fear was justified. The fear of being captured and sold into slavery 
in one of the many North African markets was more than a probability. In 1620, 
the residents of Manfredonia knew only too well when, after a pirate raid more 
than two hundred men were dragged to Barbary. Reports of the events say that 
the attackers slaughtered the people «bashing the young children’s heads against 
walls and hanging the old women from the door frames». After looting and de-
stroying «many houses in the city»3, the barbaric crew took to the seas leaving 
behind a trail of death and destruction.
Apart from this and many other episodes taken from contemporary sources, 
trying to understand this collective sentiment means looking at the structure of 
the Kingdom of Naples in the early modern age, from the unarmed borders of 
a helpless pawn in the Mediterranean chess game4. From the early decades of 
the sixteenth century, the political and military changes have had serious impact 
on the maritime areas. On one hand, the Ottoman empire who after conquering 
Egypt and Syria extended its control to the North African rulers, on the other 
hand the Spanish Empire, that after the epic Reconquista, had tried to seize a 
series of transport hubs on the African coast. The result was a conflict that apart 
from its political and ideological aspects, marked the domination of two empires, 
both influenced by outside interests (the Middle East and Persia for the Ottoman 
Empire, the New World and the Atlantic for Spain) but in the Mediterranean they 
found the source and the limit of their power5. 
The stages of the battle are all too well-known to be remembered here, more-
over they constitute the thematic topics on which Fernand Braudel built his clas-
sic works of modern historical writing, like Le Méditerranée et le monde med-
iterranéen à l’époque de Philippe II6. It is enough to highlight that the seizing 
of Algiers in 1515 marked the rise of the brothers Aruc and Kayr ed Din (called 
Barbarossa). This last one in particular, declared he was loyal to the Sultan Selim 
non linked to slavery currently practiced between the shores of Mare Nostrum. Among 
the numerous works with a general background: Benassar  ̶ Benassar, 1989; Blackburn 
1997; Bono, 1997; Bono 1999; Colley, 2002; Davis, 2003; Marmon 1999; Jaspert ̶ Kolditz, 
2013. In a legal-historical perspective, see, recently Messinetti, 2020. 
2 Razzi, 1968, p. 63; see also Mafrici 1996, p.64. 
3  Biblioteca della Società Napoletana di Storia Patria, ms. XXVIII B 11, Relatione della pre-
sa di Manfredonia, f.68. On the pillaging in the cities of Puglia: Panareo, 1952, p. 28; as 
well as Mafrici, p. 65. 
4  Ajello, 1992.
5  Mascilli Migliorini, 2009, p. 76. 
6  Seminal study edited for the first time in France in 1949, the works of Fernanad Braudel 
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I, and he was nominated Beylerbey, showing that he was a courageous military 
leader and a shrewd politician, he organized from his outposts on the North Afri-
can coast a methodical rapid war in the Mediterranean that kept the navy of the 
Catholic Monarchy and their allies under constant control. The situation for the 
Spanish became even more critical after 1532, when Barbarossa, to answer to 
the seizure of the Corone of Morea in the Aegean sea by Andrea Doria (passed 
suddenly from the French to the Iberians), was nominated Kapudan Pascià, that 
is Admiral in Chief of the Ottoman fleet. At the head of an imposing fleet, Bar-
barossa plundered the coasts of southern Italy up to the mouth of the Tiber River 
and the fleeting success reported by Carlo V with the capture of Tunisi in 1535 
was of no use7. The defeat that the Imperial army suffered in Prévesa in 1538, 
showed the superiority of the Ottoman-Barbaresque navy that seemed to be 
undefeated, so much so that for three decades, until the battle of Lepanto, the 
European blockade was not able to organize a meaningful response8. Concealed 
and only seemingly hidden from the harshness of the conflict between the two 
opposing forces on the Mediterranean emerged the role of France, ally of the 
Ottoman Empire and had more interest than ever in maintaining their leading 
role that affected the Italian Peninsula and the Kingdom of Naples in particular. 
The invasion of the Kingdom in 1528 by the troops controlled by Oddette de 
Foix, count of Lautrec, on one side marked the end of military campaigns and 
on the other hand, it was not the last effort for the French side to gain control of 
the south9. The combined pressure applied by France and the Ottoman-Barbary 
threat made it difficult to defend the Kingdom from outside enemies and became 
one of the main problems for the Habsburg Court. In retrospect, this is an impor-
establishes, as known, one of the most mentioned and discussed reference points within 
the historical debate. The epitome of the story of the Mediterranean that links togeth-
er political events, social and economic figures, and natural environment has raised an 
undisputed point by encouraging the comparison between information and studies that 
are a close comparison to the theories of the great French historian. Among the many 
works that discussed Bruadel’s paradigm within the framework of the Mediterranean 
Studies: Matvejević, 1999; D. Abulafia, 2003; J.J. Norwich, 2006. A Corrupted Sea. Study 
of Mediterranean History, edited by P. Hordern and N. Purcell, 2006, deserves a sepa-
rate mention. The work reintroduced the ideal of Braudel on the substantial unity of 
the Mediterranean world focusing the attention on the connection between the diverse 
prominent regions in the area launching a new season of studies. From this perspective 
Marino, 2002; Harris, 2005. 
7  Casanova, 2009, p. 83. 
8  Casanova 2009, p. 84. The analytical examination of the events that are of interest to 
the Mediterranean basin in the sixteenth century and the relationship between the ‘tha-
lassocracy’ of Costantinople the North African regencies and the Spanish world, among 
the numerous contributions: Wolf, 1979; Maravall, 1984 [1979]; Motta 1998; Mantran, 
1999 [1989]; Inalcik  ̶ D. Quataert, 1994; Glete, 2000; Suraiya Farouqhi, 2008.
9  On the basic opportunities of the Franco-Hispanic conflict for control of the South of 
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tant sign that epitomizes the political significance that the Spanish presence had 
on the Neapolitan Viceroylty in Modern Age: Don Pedro de Toledo10.
In particular, one must examine two aspects of the complex Toledan policy, 
two political options that had long-term consequences on the Social-Institutional 
framework of the Kingdom of Naples. In the first place, the detailed organiza-
tion of a defense system to protect the coasts by responding to precise strategic 
guidelines: passive defense. Instead of arming a navy fleet of vast proportions, 
the Spanish government moved towards creating complicated military posts and 
fortresses stationed in strategic points of the Kingdom11. As is known, this choice, 
was closely tied to another political aspect ‘Viceré di ferro’(Iron Viceroy): dis-
possession of the subjects of the Kingdom from the focal points and taking away 
their decision-making power, culminated in the expulsion of the aristocracy in 
1542 – or as was said of the rulers of ‘cappa corta’ – (short robes) of the Consiglio 
Collaterale, the highest governing body of the Kingdom12.
Aurelio Cernigliaro13 brought to attention that the Toledo choice had an impact 
on the attempt to reorganize the institutional and judicial structures exceeding 
the assets inherited from the previous event. Already Charles V in an Instruction 
sent to Naples in 1518 pointed out the necessity to overcome the pockets of re-
sistance and the move towards feudality and aristocracy and rationalize govern-
ment structures with experienced and trusted personnel. At the same time, the 
Neapolitan nobility had an ambiguous role with Spain during those frantic days 
in 1528, as did the strong pro-France party that recruited numerous aristocratic 
supporters. 
The events that took place a few years later in the frenzied scene of the king-
dom only confirmed that Habsburg’s fears were far from unfounded. In fact the 
drawings of one of the major feudal lords of the kingdom were symbolic – Fer-
rante Sanseverino – to overthrow the Spanish government with the help of the 
French and the Ottoman fleet14, as well as the conspiring plots of Pietro Carafa 
(advocate of one of the oldest Neapolitan families, ascended to the Papal throne 
as Paul IV) that lead a battle without quarter against the Spanish in southern 
Italy15.
It is in fact because of mistrust, suspicion or as said at the time, the inconfien-
cia with which Spain looked at the Neapolitan nobility it went on to become the 
Italian peninsula: Hernando Sánchez, 2001; Galasso  ̶ Hernando Sánchez, 2004 
10  For an updated analysis of the bibliographic guidelines on Toledan politics: Hernando 
Sánchez, 1994; Sánchez García, 2016. 
11  Russo, 1989; Brunetti, 2006, pp. 295-306. 
12  Pilati, 1994, p. 244 n.13; Ajello, 1999, pp. 45-46. 
13  Cernigliaro, 1983, pp. 267-268. On The specific characteristics of the political plans of 
the Marquis of Villafranca, see Cernigliaro, 1988, in part. pp. 3-212.
14  De Frede 1977; Pilati, 2015. 
15  On the subject of the ‘Carafesca War’ and the role of Carlo Carafa in the unscrupulous 
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symbol of a very long and persistent recurrence in the politics of the Viceroyal-
ty. Naples became even more a chancery law, bureaucratic metropolis, where a 
leading role was assumed by the legal-bureaucratic class, but at the same time it 
was privy of the know-how of any martial, war-like element and found the nobil-
ity to be its first and foremost connection16.
With regard to the lawyer administrator – also known as ‘togati’ – one must 
make it clear how they played a leading role during the political controversy in 
the Kingdom of Naples of the Ancient Regime. The historiographers not only ana-
lyzed the characteristics of the public figures (of which the legal component was 
fundamental) but also the level of independence with respect to the monarchy 
as well as from the other rival powers on the political scene17. Although it is im-
portant not to confuse this professional group as a social group – almost as if it 
were a surrogate for the middle class  ̶ undoubtedly it was among their ranks that 
the most important people came to be recruited so that a legal tradition was de-
veloped in order to better understand the State as a public entity and to defend 
civil dominance against the exorbitant ecclesiastical demands18. Naturally, to em-
phasize their role in the cultivation of the implementation of the modern state 
does not mean that they could physically assume the responsibility of defending 
the coasts of the Kingdom, traditionally entrusted to the nobility. 
The impact of the defensive plan of the fragile frontiers of the kingdom made 
themselves heard. Without a doubt, many studies have shown19, that to arm a 
competitive fleet to fight the Barbary and Ottoman Empire threat on the seas, 
would have brought to the bloodless coffers of the Spanish Empire an unsus-
tainable financial obligation, especially since the Catholic Monarch was simul-
taneously engaged with war on a planetary level. Under these circumstances, 
a naval rearmament would have been possible only on the condition that only 
noble swordsmen with financial resources and the necessary skills to reach the 
goal would be involved. However, on this front the suspected Pro-French sympa-
thies that the better part of the Neapolitan nobility had, built an insurmountable 
barrier between the aristocracy and the government of Spain. The outcome in 
politics assumed under Pope Paul IV: Prosperi, 1976; Santarelli, 2006.
16  R. Ajello, 1999; Del Bagno 2019. 
17  Mousnier, 1970; Ajello, 1976; Del Bagno, 1993; Miletti, 1995. 
18  Luongo 2001; Luongo 2018. 
19  Among the numerous works that investigated the state and inconsistency of the fleet 
serving the Spanish Empire as well as the complex strategic plans to hold together the 
immense structure of the Spanish dominion, the classic opera by Parker, 1998. Significant 
is also the use of an interpretation that influenced the progressive interdependence and 
integral domains of the crown within the intricate connection of the Spanish Imperial 
system, so as to analyze the complex mechanisms that were at the origins of the military 
strategy of the Habsburg Empire. For a more in-depth discussion on the complex strategic 
military plans of the Iberian Empire, C. Riley, 1977; Rizzo, 2007. Anatra  ̶ Mele  ̶ Murgia  ̶ 
Serrelli, 2008; Pacini, 2013. 
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the face of the Barbary threat was to present a defensive tactic by organizing a 
passive, wait and see strategy, articulated in a cumbersome defensive scheme 
on the coast that excluded by its nature every opportunity to bring the battle to 
the open seas20. The unresolved crisis escaped the protagonist’s themselves. The 
papers stored in the General Archive of Simancas are a precious source to under-
stand the knowledge of their compatriots in regards to the military vulnerability 
of the kingdom. 
The Adriatic and Apulian fronts in particular exposed to the pirate attacks were 
the most tangible example of the fact that the coastal areas were defended leav-
ing other areas without any defenses and open to raids. This meant that it was 
easy for the pirates to attack them. It gives further testimony to the effectiveness 
of a defensive system and for this reason the northern coast of Apulia was the 
topic of a paper sent in 1544 from the guard captain of the Fort of Gallipoli (lo-
cated at the extreme eastern edge of the coastline) after the pirate attack carried 
out on the coast of Vieste on the Gargano. As the Captain tells, the pirate ships 
had stopped on the coast of the Adriatic, but decided not to attack the coast be-
cause it was adequately defended. The attackers, under the command of Captain 
Dragut, started to travel north to a part of the coast that did not have any defens-
es and attacked the city. According to the report, it was easy for the pirates to 
attack places lacking in arms much easier than attacking defensive garrisons that 
would have been able to organize an adequate defense21.
Beyond the Turkish plans of attack and the strategy that was proposed, in the 
state of defense that the coastal areas of the South was in, it is possible to read 
about it in a report sent to Madrid by Ferdinando Loffredo, Marquis of Trevico 
who in 1566 did not fail to condemn the shortcomings of the defense system. 
The castle of Manfredonia, essential for its strategic position because «in times of 
fortune they sail through those seas and carry a large quantity of goods to bring 
throughout the kingdom and other parts of Italy» it represented an inadequate 
fortress for its defensive needs. Although it presided over Apulia «this land is 
very weak and the castle was the worst and could not be defended even for one 
day»22. As well, the castle of Barletta «that has the same importance as the one 
mentioned by Manfredonia»23 even if it had been under recent attacks was made 
up of a «very small» garrison while the marina of Trani which «had a port that if 
it were free could hold up to sixty closed galleys as if it was a locked door on all 
20  Ajello, 1994. 
21  Archivo General de Simancas (cited hereafrter as AGS), Fundos de Instituciones de An-
tiguo Regimen, Estado, Nápoles, Legajo 1035, f. 60. On this point see also Mafrici, 1996, 
pp. 61-62
22  AGS, Fundos des Instituciones de Antiguo Regimen, Estado, Nápoles, Legajo 1046, f. 
227.
23  AGS, Fundos des Instituciones de Antiguo Regimen, Estado, Nápoles, Legajo 1046, f. 
227.
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the coast, very unprotected and weak so much so that in case of a battle it could 
not defend itself for more than two hours»24 
Again is 1566, in comparison with the “warnings from the east” that foretold a 
Saracen raid on the northern coast of Apulia, the viceroy admitted in a disheart-
ening voice that «there are no people left in places that can be defended…. As 
well …. We cannot defend all the places on the coast», hoping at the same time 
that the pirate ships would head more south: «I hope that the pirate fleet will go 
to Bari or Otranto where they could suffer many damages» where if there had 
been several military strongholds the attacks from the enemies could have been 
repelled25.
As remembered, to modify and overcome the vulnerability of the coast it was 
necessary to reverse the defensive strategy, arming a capable fleet to succes-
sively counterattack the Barbary pressure. A very clear study of this period was 
shown in 1554 by Giulio Cesare Caracciolo. He represents one of the Neapolitan 
nobility most in the public eye, moderate and anything but inclined toward the 
Pro-French excesses. The report condemned the absolute subordination of the 
weak defenses of the kingdom in regards to the Barbary threat. At the same time, 
Caracciolo did not limit himself to a simple conclusion, but showed a detailed 
strategy including the necessary expenses to build a war fleet. One point that 
cannot be disregarded by the Neapolitan nobility, that the business of fitting-out 
a fleet would see the nobility of the kingdom in a leading position, that even if 
they could not give the necessary funds according to the Venetian naval design, 
at least they could offer their competence in recruitment and management of 
the ships26. 
The distrust among the social classes and the danger forewarned by the Span-
ish Court to strengthen the alliance like that of the nobility ready to side with 
the French was a stumbling block, so that Caracciolo’s plan would become an 
obsolete report. In hindsight, only Don Giovanni of Austria expressed an interest 
in the plan to rearm the kingdom after the victorious battle of Lepanto. But only 
the battle fought in the Ionian sea marked a fundamental part of the defense of 
the Viceroy.
The truce between the Catholic Monarch and the Ottoman Empire became al-
ways more stable and the attention that the two powers reserved for the oppor-
tunities outside the Mediterranean basin, left the problem of the vulnerability 
24  AGS, Fundos des Instituciones de Antiguo Regimen, Estado, Nápoles, Legajo 1046, f. 
227. On this report see: Coniglio, 1987, I, pp. 301-303.
25  AGS, Fundos de Instituciones de Antiguo Regimen, Estado, Nápoles, Legajo 1055, f. 
165. On the defensive strategy of Adriatic Coasts and this dispatch, see Mafrici 1996, pp. 
62-63
26  The discourse of Giulio Cesare Caracciolo was published followed by notes and a de-
tailed commentary by Ajello, 1999 pp. 263-384. On the recruiting and equipment of the 
fleets during the Early Modern Era, see: Aymard, 1974, pp. 71-90; Candiani, 2006. 
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of the south confined to the bottom of the list of the political agenda of Spain. 
As Fernand Braudel summarized, ‘political piracy’ was at an end after Lepanto 
and a less conspicuous but not less harmful episode began for the kingdom of 
Naples. It dealt with the breakup of the Barbary initiative into a myriad of pirate 
initiatives, a more moderate fight, but continuous and uninterrupted where the 
protagonists – wrote Braudel – like “wild animals” went «game hunting in pro-
portion to their ambitions» and their actions were more similar to «that of a 
miserable robbery»27.
It was just this endless string aimed at characterizing everyday life of the peo-
ple of the kingdom that fed “the siege of fear”, but above all, it contributed over 
time to the highlights that signaled the marginal economic growth and the par-
ticular political structure of Southern Italy. Raffaele Ajello, who is responsible for 
having emphasized the close ties with the disarmament of the kingdom and the 
social and institutional inconsistencies of Southern Italy summed up the ques-
tion underlining how the disastrous aristocratic defeat created other fatal event 
which it turn had a fatal result. First – according to the author ̶ the Spanish hostil-
ity towards the Neapolitan aristocrats firmly contributed to this imbalance. The 
Neapolitan society while living in the Mediterranean under very tense conditions 
gradually saw how the martial component became unnerving and downhearted 
and the society eventually became passive and inert in the face of constant war. 
The substantial disarmament of the nobility even more morally ideological than 
material subjected to the bureaucratic class prevented the restructuring of the 
martial and knightly situation towards new useful forms of contemporary socie-
ty28.
Lacking a shared project and a sufficiently large social base to deal with the 
complex problems opened up by its fragile defenses, in the kingdom it would 
have been the lawyers who would make themselves heard about the delicate 
topic of the pirate raids in the waters of Southern Italy. It is worth emphasiz-
ing that it was the voice of those who imagined themselves as custodians of a 
priestly knowledge, with a wealth of conceivably refined skills, far from tangible 
problems. It was an undertaking that could possibly put a permanent mark on 
the social and institutional reality of the Viceroyalty with a theoretical discussion 
that if on one hand there was the treatment to be legally reserved for the enemy 
represented by the pirate, and on the other hand a meaningful contrast, was the 
role reserved for friend within the legislation, thus defining model citizens, legal 
assets, the position of the southern monarchy on an international level29 
Naturally, it would be a mistake to try to find among the actions of the law-
yers of the kingdom of Naples in the modern age, articulate and direct word-
27  Braudel 1976, p. 1232.  On this point, see also Mafrici 1996, 25. 
28  Ajello, 1994, p. 140.
29  Scholarship have highlighted the fundamental role of the inclusion and exclusion pro-
cess and ‘friend-enemy’ combination in the formation of the modern state. Within this 
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ing between the structure of the government and social relationships. The legal 
language was based on a technique that concealed the openly political issues 
to favour rhetorical methods based on alleged, neutral choices as described by 
the general consent, social relationships and the nature of things. Nonetheless, 
in certain contexts when the legal society (academic, judicial, bureaucratic) was 
called upon, they would have specific government strategies and political guide-
lines to determine how to cope with the aspects of piracy in the waters of the 
realm30. 
Symbolic is the case of Giovan Francesco De Ponte, one of the most renowned 
and influential lawyers of the ancient Neapolitan regime who dedicated him-
self to the close examination of the problems created by the Ottoman-Barbary 
threat, the title of his XI most renowned work and widely quoted in the following 
Tractaus de Potestate Proregis, Collateralis Consilii et regimine Regni31.
In fact it is very important to note that the Neapolitan lawyer, the fundamental 
characteristic of the structure of the monarchy could not be exempt from tack-
ling an issue not only as has been seen, represented a key point of the entire 
structure of the social and political relationships, but generally it was part of a 
debate on a European scale that, following the fundamental functions assumed 
by businesses along the ocean route, the view taken on the subject of pirates and 
the war assume a courageous role on the organizational system and the control 
of the relationship among the different states to give effect to their actions and 
hope to guarantee mutual recognition from the general community to the polit-
ical community.
As known, the credit goes to Alberico Gentili for having developed the idea of 
piracy being an important reference point from a legal point of view32. In his De 
slow and laborious journey, a key role to determine the policies that were to be imple-
mented in regards to the enemy was taken on by the legal society. A widespread mis-
conception is inclined to think of the law as a means to regulate social relationships that 
is limited to changing the values that are made in other cultural areas. Actually, the law 
has an effective creativity that is much greater because in outlining a defined imaginary 
society, it contributes to creating the same values that it intends to protect. In this way, 
the definition of ‘enemy’, contributes to the course of action of the legal system. As Piet-
ro Costa clarified (Costa, 2009), the law is not limited to considering the idea of ‘enemy’ 
(internal or external), but rather using the law to allow it to take shape, give it an iden-
tity, use the most means for its prosecution. On the use of paradigm of ‘enemy’ in the 
discourse about piracy, see: Thompson, 1994; Grewe, 2000, pp. 304-312; Ruschi, 2009; 
Bonafé, 2011.
30  Luongo, 2008a; Luongo, 2008b.
31  Johannes Franciscus De Ponte (1541-1616) De potestate Proregis, Collateralis consilii, 
et Regni regimine tractatus, Neapoli, 1611, tit. XI, De triremibus coeterisque navibus aut 
navigiis, quae in cursu destinantur, pp.520-532. On a bio-bibliographical profile of De 
Ponte, see: Comparato, 1974, pp. 260-273; Zotta, 1987, Luongo 2011, pp. 706-708.  
32  The bibliography on the lawyer of San Giensio (1552-1608), is understandably quite 
57The threat from the sea
iure belli the Italian lawyer reintroduced the classic definition of a pirate given by 
Cicero as common enemy of all33. This notation, if true, was embedded in an es-
tablished tradition, even in the works of Gentili was outlined with great precision 
because it showed the appearance of the pirate as a public enemy referring to 
the raids and the sea pillaging as an act against ius gentium34. Certainly the Gen-
tilian way of thinking had more than one ambiguous description both in relation 
to the things done by the Barbary regime on the Mediterranean coast and to the 
general problem in relation to the legal procedure to be adopted and the rela-
tionship between states between acts of piracy (illegal) and acts of privateering 
(commonly accepted and practiced by all political entities in the Modern Age)35. 
However, Gentili’s main point relative to the idea of the pirate as a common ene-
my and as a person excluded from civil society would be depicted in the words of 
a modern scholar – David Hallen Rozen – defined the “piractical paradigm” that 
represents a theoretical framework to combine efforts made from the individual 
European legal systems to fight and repress the pirate phenomenon36.
In any case, it is important to note that like Giovan Francesco De Ponte in his 
Tractatus firmly sees the figure of the Mediterranean pirate as the enemy. The 
Turkish galleys that sailed the waters close to the Kingdom’s coast were protago-
nists of many acts of war to warrant the raiders the name ‘enemy’ that involved 
the Southern Monarchy in a continued campaign of the struggling public, not-
withstanding the formal truce declared between the Spanish and the Ottoman, 
in defense of Christianity and the integrity of the Realm. With a complex network 
of quotes which have among them the most cited auctoritates of ius commune, 
vast. In addition to the recent printing of the ‘editio princeps’ of De iure belli with intro-
duction by D. Quaglioni, translation by P. Nencini, review by G. Marchetto and C. Zendri, 
2008, that reminds to a widespread bibliography, see: Atti, 1988; Atti, 1991; Atti, 1995; 
Atti, 1998; Atti, 1999; Atti, 2000; Atti, 2003; Atti, 2006; Atti, 2008; Atti, 2009; Atti, Atti, 
2010; Atti, 2012; Atti, 2014; Ilari, 1981, Panizza 1981, Panizza 2002, Wijffels, 1999; De 
Benedictis 1999 Quaglioni, 2000; Kingsbury, 2001; Birocchi 2009; Lacchè, 2009; Quaglioni 
̶ Zancarini, 2010; Quaglioni, 2010, Ferronato  ̶ Bianchin 2011; Quaglioni, 2013, Minnucci 
2013; Fedele, 2017; Colavecchia 2018.
33  Cicero, De officiis, III 107-108: «nam pirata non est ex perduellium numero definitus, 
sed communis hostis omnium; cum hoc nec fides debet nec ius iurandum esse com-
mune», see: Alberico Gentili, (1552-1608), Il diritto di Guerra. (De iure belli libri III, 1598), 
2008, I, 4, p. 32. 
34  Simpson, 2007, pp. 219–30.
35  On the problem of the mobile boundary between piracy and privateering, see Ruschi, 
2003.
36  Heller-Roazen, 2009, Eklöf Amirell 2019, p. 31.
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like those of Bartolus of Sassoferrato37, Bartolomeo of Saliceto38, Felino Sandei39, 
it was De Ponte that would introduce the reader to a discipline that would legiti-
mize the subjects of the kingdom to carry out hostile acts against the infidels like 
those of their subjects to the allies, with the right to capture enemy ships. How-
ever, the thing that mattered most was clearly seeing the atrocious character of 
the pirates through their deeds, even in the absence of a formal declaration of 
war adopted by the Kingdom, it legitimized a perpetuum bellum publicum ac-
cording to the discussions between theologians and lawyers40. 
What now needs to be highlighted, is that the reasoning of De Ponte even 
though tinged with universalistic tones and hostile and confessional ideology in 
regards to the activities of the Barbary regime, was not an indiscriminate war 
and least of all a military campaign launched by all the states against the threat 
of piracy according to Alberico Gentili that had derived a universal right to fight, 
pursue and punish piracy. 
The rest, beyond the profitable idea that influenced the image of the enemy, 
the two authors had very different perspectives on the repression of piracy. Apart 
from the obvious historiographical debate on the role of jurist from the Marche 
in long and laboured itinerary for the secularization of international law41, Gentili 
demanded a fight without boundaries against the pirates on the basis of their 
exploits and the violence of their acts excluding them from civil society justifying 
their every act of force to neutralize the threat and to ensure a peaceful existence 
among the people. Instead, in the distance was the reasoning reserved for de-
claring permanent war against the Ottoman Empire. Contrary to the biased con-
fessionals – silete theologi in munere alieno ̶̶– ̶the Turks in fact represented the 
enemy not because of their religious diversity, but because of their innate way 
of acting, they threatened, conspired and robbed without mercy42. On the other 
hand, Da Ponte had an opinion of the pirate as an unconditional adaptation of 
an infidel clinging to the connection between a lawful tradition that legitimized 
the permanent state of war in honour of the ideological and religious hostilities 
against enemies of faith43. It is certainly not a coincidence that the Neapolitan 
lawyer together with the reasons for the bellum piraticum, tried to implement 
a mise en forme of the conflict in the Mediterranean waters that was in accord-
37  Bartolus a Saxoferrato (1313-1357), In secundum Digesti Novi Commentaria […], Vene-
tiis 1615, f. 215v (D. 49, tit.: De captivis et postiliminio, lex: Si quid bello, 2).
38  Barholomeus a Salyceto († 1411), In octavum Codicis libum Commentaria […,] Venetiis, 
1586, f. 163v (C. 8, 50 [51], tit.: De postiliminio, lex: Ab hostibus).
39  Felinus Sandeus (1444-1503), In Decretalium librum quintum Commentaria […], Basile-
ae 1567, co. 1108 (5, 7: tit.: De haereticis, cap.13: Excomunicamus, n. 3).
40  Hubrect, 1961; Russell, 1975; Johnson 1981; Cassi 2003; Quaglioni 2004. 
41  Nuzzo, 2009.
42  Cassi, 2012, p. 187. 
43  Haggenmacher, 1983, p. 242. 
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ance with the well-established plans of bellum iustum legitimate warfare typical 
of canon law (auctoritas superioris, iusta causa, recta intentio)44. There was no 
doubt that in the case of bellum publicum declared against the Ottoman vessels 
there was the approval of a higher authority, just as could not be denied the 
existence of a iusta causa as well as legitimate behavior even if diffidatio an act 
which, according to the law of war would give way to hostilities, in force in re ipsa 
against the infidels.45. All this confirmed, according to De Ponte, the specific title 
of hostes publici reserved for the Turkish crews with the correlative right to cap-
ture Ottoman vessels for the fleet of the southern monarchy. After all, continued 
De Ponte, the right of the Neapolitan vessels to proceed against the Ottoman 
and Barbarian ships was a deeply established principle of the government of the 
southern monarchy. Beyond the competence and the judicial authority in the 
matter of maritime travel reserved for the Great Admiral, which had been widely 
discussed by Tapia in his Ius Regni46, the right to proceed in the capture of prop-
erty belonging to the enemy had been the subject of a decisio referred to and 
commented on by Tommaso Grammatico 47. As the Neapolitan lawyer argued, 
the right to capture not only vessels that belonged to the subjects of the Sultan, 
but extended as well to the vessels and subjects of those who were enemies of 
Christianity, as confirmed in two consilia written by Giovanni Antonio Lanario48 
and by De Ponte himself 49 about the sinking of a vessel off the coast of Ostuni 
that had been led by some Jewish merchants. In short, as Giovan Battista de Toro, 
would have commented, called upon to write down the Tractatus of De Ponte, 
the pirate was a double enemy not only because he besieged the seas with plun-
dering and raids, but because he was also an infidel50; as such, this demonstrated 
a radical sense of hostility towards who  ̶ as Covarruvias had written 51, promptly 
made use of by De Toro  ̶ with their behaviour was acting against the law of na-
ture and «ipsius naturalis appetitus inclinationem». 
44  On this topic, in addition to Russel, 1975; Johnson, 1981; Haggenmacher 1983; see 
also: Chenu, 1958; La paix, 1961; Keen 1965; Contamine, 1980; Contamine, 1998; Garcia 
Fitz 2003; Chittolini, 2007; Quaglioni 2007; Cassi, 2009. 
45  Johannes Franciscus De Ponte, De potestate Proregis […], p. 527. 
46  Carolus Tapia (1565-1644), Ius Regni Neapolitani […], Neapoli 1605, II, rub. 31. 
47  Decisiones Sacri Regii Consilii neapolitani per Thomam Grammaticum […], Venetiis, 
1588, dec. 71, pp. 438-444. 
48  Johannes Antonius Lanarius (1540-1590), Consilia sive iuris responsa […], Venetiis, 
1598, II, n. 84, ff. 150v-155r. 
49  Johannes Franciscus De Ponte, Consilia sive iuris responsa, […], Venetiis 1595, I, n.93, 
ff.228r-229r.
50  Johannes Baptista De Thoro (1574-1655), Additiones seu adnotationes utilissimae ad 
[….] Tractatum de poteste proregis eisq. Collateralis Consilii [..] Io Francisci De Ponte […] a 
Io. Baptista de Thoro, Neapoli, 1621, ad tit. XI, De Triremibus, p. 199.
51  Diego Covarruvias (1512-1577), Regulae Peccatum. De Regulis iuris, Libro Sexto, Relec-
tio, Genevae, 1724, II, 10, n.4, p. 644. 
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In hindsight, the reasonings of the Neapolitan lawyer is closely linked to anoth-
er matter that in his discussions is overwhelming and adheres to the opposition 
with the Republic of Venice about the alleged claim from ‘La Serenissima’ to con-
sider the Adriatic sea as closed sea, that is subject to only one jurisdiction prohib-
iting access to armed vessels flying a foreign flag and imposing custom duties and 
anchoring rights to merchant ships that surpassed the imaginary coastline that 
connected Otranto to Valon52.
Here it is impossible to dwell on specific people involved in a longstanding dis-
pute that unleashed a real ‘ink war’53 between Neapolitan and Venetian lawyers 
and saw among others, engaged in a bitter political diplomatic conflict, together 
with de Ponte writers like Juan Batista Valenzuela, Orazio d’Afeltro and on the 
venetian side such writers of caliber like Angelo Matteacci, Giulio Pace, without 
mentioning the stance taken by Paolo Sarpi in favour of the naval empire of ‘La 
Serenissima’54.
The recent historiography clearly outlined the very tight relationship that legal-
ly linked piracy to the freedom of the seas, highlighting how piracy represented 
both a cause and an effect of legal regulation of the seas arranged by states in 
the modern age. A reason to determine the needs for each maritime power, to 
establish control over navigation routes; the result being that the same control 
aroused a reaction from its adversaries and the financing of the current war in 
the name of the freedom of the seas55. 
In the case of Venice, the presumption to consider the Adriatic as a closed, 
restricted private sea had deep seated roots in the past and dated back to the 
anti-pirate repression exerted by the Venetian Republic of the Middle Ages. As 
Paolo Sarpi pointed out in the second decade of the 17th century, the dominion 
of the seas that had been originally free, were gradually bought by Venice by the 
public authorities of the seas that became more efficient in repressing piracy, 
an undertaking that had cost Venice «every year the bloodshed of many of its 
citizens and the loss of many of its treasures»56. Exactly for the reason that the 
sea was owned by the people and because there was no objection from Venice in 
the repression of the pirate raids it had been decided by the law of prescription, 
a Sovereign right that was put into practice in the Adriatic Sea, considered to all 
52  Tenenti, 1999; Pezzolo, 2018.
53  The political diplomatic conflict that also culminated in a broad jurisdictional dispute 
was written about by Pietro Giannone in his Istoria Civile del Regno di Napoli (Civil History 
of the Kingdom of Naples) v. 3, 1. XIII, chap. 1. p. 216-243, 1865[1725]; and retraced with 
a wealth of topics in another edited version entitled Intorno al dominio del Mare Adriati-
co (Around the dominion of the Adriatic sea), 1824, [1755], pp. 502-548, see also Paliaga 
2014, that furnishes an extensive bibliography of the operas written in the dispute.
54  Cessi, 1953; Scovazzi, 2007, Descendre, 2007.
55  Cassi, 2004, p. 141 Cassi, 2007, p. 36. 
56  Paolo Sarpi (1552-1623), Dominio del mar Adriatico della Serenissima Repubblica di 
Venezia, Helmstat [Venezia] 1750, pp. 327-368, p. 328. 
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intents and purposes subject to the authority of Venice.57. 
On the other hand, De Ponte systematically countered the arguments of the 
Venetian side. His reasoning was based on a well-known passage by Baldus de 
Ubaldis 58 that declared that the sea belonged to everyone, whereas on the con-
trary the right of ownership could not be of anyone, and finally the jurisdiction 
that belonged to the Emperor – dominus omnium  ̶ . On the basis of this definition, 
Da Ponte affirmed that the claim boasted by the Venetians should be classified as 
nothing more than an illegitimate usurpation. Excluded on the natural law that 
the Venetian Republic could have acquired the dominium on the sea as a result of 
possession brought about by the repression of piracy, at most the power claimed 
by Venice could have been a privilege granted by the Emperor. Nevertheless, the 
possibility that Venetian power could be founded on an imperial concession had 
to be categorically excluded, both for the lack of a privilege that is specifically 
attributed to the Venetian Republic the iurisdictio in the Adriatic Sea, and even if 
it were to be considered in existence, it could not have had any effect on the Reg-
num. In fact, if as Bartolomeo Cipolla had claimed the dominion of the Adriatic 
Sea was the result of special imperial permission originating from the fact that 
the regulations of the Venetian Republic had been set up by praxis as an order 
superiorem non recognoscens59, this issue could not in any way adversely affect 
the opposing claims by the Neapolitans. In hindsight, De Ponte concluded in a 
contradictory argument, a hypothetical imperial concession could not have had 
an effect on the kingdom in any way because it too was an autonomous order 
that was completely independent from imperial authority and also superiorem 
non recognoscens, because any imperial permission could not have weakened 
the possessions of the Church to which – as was known – the Regnum was linked 
to by a feudal bond60. The true character of usurpation vaunted by the Venetian 
Republic on the Adriatic Sea would have been continued by another barrister 
who was involved in the controversy around the reasoning for supporting the 
Regnum: Juan Baptista Valenzuela Velazquez. In one of his consilia 61 he discussed 
at length his reasonings beginning with a well-known thesis of Bartolus of Sasso-
ferrato who had identified the limit of power on the seas of the coastal regions 
within one hundred miles62. This limit was based on projections in the sea of the 
57  Ivi, p. 360. 
58  Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400), In primam Digesti Veteris partem Commentaria [...], 
Venetiis, 1599, f. 462, (D. 1.8.2 tit.: De divisione rerum, lex: Quaendam).
59  Bartholomaeus Caepolla (1420-1475), Tractatus II de servitutibus tam urbanorum 
quam rusticorum, caput XXVI, De mari, n.10-12, pp. 423-424. See, Mazzacane, 1980; Ze-
ndri, 2007.
60  On this fundamental topic, see among the many studies: Calasso, 1957. 
61  Johannes Baptista Valenzuela Velazquez (1574-1645), Consilia sive responsa [...] Nea-
poli, 1618, n. 100, pp. 781-794. 
62  Bartolus a Soxoferrato, In primam Digesti Veteris partem Commentaria, Venetiis, 1615, 
f. 151v, (D. 5.1.9. tit.: De iudiciis, lex: Insulae Italiae). On this position of Bartolus, see: 
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powers exercised on actual territory, in the opinion of Valenzuela also applied to 
the situation in the Adriatic, resulting in, continued the author that Venice could 
have boasted iurisdictio on the sea adjacent to its coasts. This power could not 
be extended beyond the limit cited above, under penalty of the detriment of the 
other coastal states such as the Kingdom of Naples, the Duchy of Urbino or the 
territories that were under the domain of the Church. On the other hand, histor-
ical experience had demonstrated that the Neapolitan ships had had for some 
time peaceful access to the Adriatic marine area, without the Venetian authori-
ties being able to make any claims.
There is no need to follow Valenzuela in his discussions that from this point 
on, delves into a series of examples looking to show through historical enlighten-
ment, the peaceful possession of the Adriatic Sea by the royal vessels. It would be 
more appropriate to mention that the writings of the Neapolitan juridical culture 
against piracy should be read as a tremendous loyalty towards the ambitious and 
adventurous politics of the Viceroy Duke of Ossuna in Sicily (1612-1616) and then 
in Naples (1616-1620) that tried to fight on one hand against the Ottoman-Bar-
bary presence in the Mediterranean and on the other hand to strengthen the 
Catholic Monarchy in Italy, leading a trying political-military ploy against Venice 
looking for a response by penetrating the armada in the Adriatic as well as with 
the help given to Austria in the conflict against the Republic of Venice and with 
the protection given to the Uskoks Croatian population devoted to piracy in the 
Adriatic. 
In regards to the politics of Ossuna there are contrasting historiographical 
points of view63. Without a doubt, he was weighed down by his urgent and un-
scrupulous need to fight the Saracen whose continued pillaging presence in the 
Adriatic jeopardized the continual naval supply of the apulian grain to Naples. 
This situation created enormous risks for the Viceroy authorities that were called 
upon to deal with the ancestral problems of the capital of the Kingdom, always 
quite exposed because of overcrowding and a large number of urbanized plebe-
ians with the risk of rebellion in the absence of a supply of grain. However, the 
fact remains that the policies carried out by Ossuna in the absence of a large 
naval rearmament plan would prove to be totally futile, a display of force devoid 
of adequate means to solve the problem, viewed upon badly by the governor 
of Madrid and the disastrous results in terms of the losses left by Ossuna in the 
coffers of the state, at least as written in the reports prepared at the syndicate 
visit at the end of the
Viceroy’s mandate64.
We will have to wait for the reflections of the one of the most lucid lawyers 
of the second seventeenth century, Francesco D’Andrea, to find the newfound 
Marchetti 2001; Cassi, 2004; Cassi, 2007. 
63  Linde De Castro, 2005, Sánchez García, 2011.
64  Coniglio 1955, pp. 42-70; Coniglio,1967, pp. 192-206; De Rubertiis, 1956.
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knowledge against the structural problem of the military weakness of the king-
dom and its effects from a social and economic point of view65. The writings of 
Contegna66, as well as the considerations done in the Enlightenment would have 
strongly demanded the rearmament of the fleet and the navy as an essential 
development for the kingdom67. In the climate of the new ‘national’ dynasty that 
brought to an end the period of the viceroy, a new generation of intellectuals was 
trying to deal with the problem of a renewed ancestral spirit of the privateering 
raids and the regional military fragility of the maritime border. The kingdom was 
getting ready to write a new and different chapter of its worldly relationship with 
the Mediterranean.
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riis, & copiosissimo notabilium conclusionum indice, Neapoli, ex typographia 
Tarquij Longhi, 1618.
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